Compromise and majority rule:How their dynamic affects democracy by Overeem, Patrick
VU Research Portal





DOI (link to publisher)
10.1007/978-3-030-40802-2_3
document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
document license
Article 25fa Dutch Copyright Act
Link to publication in VU Research Portal
citation for published version (APA)
Overeem, P. (2020). Compromise and majority rule: How their dynamic affects democracy. In S. Baume, & S.
Novak (Eds.), Compromises in Democracy (pp. 47-67). (Palgrave Studies in Compromise after Conflict).
Palgrave / MacMillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40802-2_3
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
E-mail address:
vuresearchportal.ub@vu.nl
Download date: 13. Sep. 2021
47© The Author(s) 2020
S. Baume, S. Novak (eds.), Compromises in Democracy, Palgrave Studies in 
Compromise after Conflict, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40802-2_3
3
Compromise and Majority Rule: How 
Their Dynamic Affects Democracy
Patrick Overeem
3.1  Introduction
“In the United States, as in all countries where the people reign, it is the 
majority that governs in the name of the people.” Thus Alexis de 
Tocqueville (2000: 165), holding that, in practice if not in theory, democ-
racy comes down to majority rule. More than most political thinkers 
before him, he realized that a democracy is never governed by the people 
in its entirety, but only by a part, even if the major part, of it. And this 
equivocation of popular rule with majority rule made him acutely aware 
of the immense danger of the tyranny of the majority. In a situation of 
such tyranny, the majority is omnipresent and omnipotent:
What I most reproach in democratic government, as it has been organized 
in the United States, is not, as many people in Europe claim, its weakness, 
but on the contrary, its irresistible force. And what is most repugnant to me 
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in America is not the extreme form of freedom that reigns there, it is the 
lack of a guarantee against tyranny. When a man or a party suffers from an 
injustice in the United States, who do you want him to address? Public 
opinion? that is what forms the majority; the legislative body? it represents 
the majority and obeys it blindly; the executive power? it is named by the 
majority and serves as its passive instrument; the public forces? the public 
forces are nothing other than the majority in arms; the jury? the jury is the 
majority with the right to pronounce decrees: in certain states, the judges 
themselves are elected by the majority. (2000: 241)
What can be done against this danger? Tocqueville sees a great number of 
things that ‘temper’ the tyranny of the majority in America, such as 
administrative decentralization, religion, and several others (ibid., 
250–302), but claims that there is “no guarantee against it” and “one 
must seek the causes of the mildness of government in circumstances and 
mores rather than in the laws” (ibid., 242). So only contingencies and 
political culture, as we would say today, are hindrances to majoritarian 
tyranny. There is no quick-fix.
This is not a very uplifting picture of democracy for its modern adher-
ents. One could wonder whether Tocqueville’s depiction is entirely accu-
rate. Is democracy really tantamount to the rule of the majority? And is 
the majority’s rule so pervasive and unstoppable as he describes it? Is there 
not another, more positive side to democratic government as well? A side 
of checks and balances, equal dignity of all citizens, ordered liberty, and 
minority inclusion? Are decisions in a democracy not often taken by 
compromise rather than the imposition of the majority’s will?
In this chapter, I analyze the intricate relationships between majority 
rule and compromise, in particular. Majority rule can be defined as the 
principle which says quite simply that, within in a group, the greater 
number decides. As Novak points out, this still allows for much variation, 
depending on “(a) the majority threshold (…); (b) the number of persons 
entitled to vote; (c) the quorum; and (4) [sic] the distribution (or weight-
ing) of votes to the participants” (2014: 681). In other words, not all 
majorities are equal. Novak helpfully distinguishes between “simple 
majority, i.e., more than half of the participants in the vote; absolute 
majority, i.e., more than half of the individuals entitled to vote; qualified 
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majority, which implies a threshold superior to simple majority; relative 
majority or plurality, which is not defined as a minimal threshold, but as 
the fact of receiving more votes than all the other options” (p. 681). So 
the apparently simple idea that ‘the greater number decides’ allows for 
various answers to questions like: number of what and greater than what?
Compromise, in its most basic sense, can be understood as an agree-
ment on a suboptimal outcome between two or more actors achieved 
through mutual concessions. This concept also implies four elements that 
are arguably present in every compromise, namely (a) an underlying and 
ongoing conflict; (b) points of partial agreement; (c) mutual concessions 
during the negotiations leading to the compromise; and (d) mutual con-
sent to the ultimate agreement. Put more graphically, a compromise is 
always a midpoint between full conflict (disagreement) and full consen-
sus (agreement) between all involved actors and between full concession 
(disagreeing) and full consent (agreeing) by each involved actor—with 
the midpoint tilting more toward one end of both dimensions or toward 
the other (Overeem 2016). Compromises vary in other ways, too, for 
instance with regard to the motives for striking them. Some are more 
‘rational’ or strategic, only serving the actors’ own interests, while others 
are more ‘reasonable,’ based on a shared understanding of the issues at 
stake and serving common ends (Canivez 2011: 100). Other theorists 
have made similar distinctions, sometimes with slight variations (for 
instance Cohen-Almagor (2006: 440–445): principled and tactical com-
promises; and Margalit (2010: 39): anemic and sanguine compromises). 
But whatever the exact formulation, such differences are always a matter 
of degree and of little consequence for the argument in this chapter.
Both notions, majority rule and compromise, are generally believed to 
be core elements of democracy, but they also seem to be squarely at odds 
with one another (e.g., Dahl 1956: 4; Gutmann & Thompson 2012: 
152–160). These diverging intuitions are the starting point of my argu-
ment in this chapter. In the subsequent sections, I will first show how 
majority rule and compromise are both key elements of modern democ-
racy. Then, I argue that they are fundamentally opposed to each other, 
cornerstones of two different kinds of democracy even (majoritarian and 
consensus democracy, as Lijphart (1984) has called them), but also that 
they are often closely related. And, I claim next, particularly where they 
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go together, the dynamic between them is a threat to democracy. This 
central claim is then highlighted by a discussion of the case of referen-
dums as a prime manifestation of majority rule and, surprisingly perhaps, 
political compromises. In the conclusion, I argue that the negative spiral 
into which the combination of majority rule and compromise leads 
democracy (especially in cases of referendums but also more generally) 
can only be reversed by mitigating majoritarianism. Compromises have 
disadvantages of their own, to be sure, but majority rule remains, as 
Tocqueville envisaged, the greater problem.
3.2  Majority Rule and Democracy
Although democracy is of course the prime example of an “essentially 
contested concept” (Gallie 1956), this does not mean that nothing sen-
sible can be said about its meaning. Several key elements may be dis-
cerned. Majority rule and compromise are both often regarded as core 
elements of democracy, albeit in different ways. Majority rule, to begin, 
seems to belong to the bare essentials of democracy (Dahl 1956). In some 
form or other, but mostly as what Sartori called “limited majority rule”, 
it tends to be part of even the thinnest conceptions of democracy, under-
stood in the famous Lincoln formula as “government of the people, by 
the people, for the people” (1987: 31–38). And it is strongly associated 
with other key notions of democracy, such as political, legal, and social 
equality, popular sovereignty, and elective representation. Modern 
democracy can certainly not be reduced to the majoritarian principle, but 
neither, it seems, would it mean much without it.
Majority rule is especially regarded as democratic because of its sup-
posed relation with political equality. Grossman and Levin have brusquely 
declared: “Majority rule treats all individuals as equals” (1995: 788). And 
Melissa Schwartzberg has recently claimed: “Majority rule may be justi-
fied on many grounds, but its most compelling justifications derive from 
its unique capacity to weigh individual votes, reflecting individuals’ judg-
ments, equally” (2018: 180). Other democratic theorists have shown, 
however, that these links between majority rule on the one hand and 
equality on the other are not so close and intrinsic as is often thought 
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(Novak 2014: 682). The egalitarian principle (‘one man, one vote’) is not 
necessarily heeded in majority decisions, as actors may be given unequal 
numbers of votes (Novak 2014: 682). And the rule that all actors should 
have the same influence on the decision-making outcome (the so-called 
anonymity rule; May 1952), holds only for absolute majority decisions, 
but not for supermajority or simple majority rule. Not only does majority 
rule lack direct links to equality, it is not inherently democratic either. 
Majority rule takes place in non-democratic, non-egalitarian settings, 
too, and democracies can and do have other decision procedures as well. 
As Novak aptly concludes: “Majority decisions do not entail democracy, 
and democracy does not entail majority decision-making” (2014: 682). 
Majority rule is a contingent, not an intrinsic part of democracy.
Still, the association of democracy with majority rule remains strong. 
It is, as noted, the decision procedure for crowds and democracy is gov-
ernment by crowds. Majority rule also seems the only decision rule that 
is simple enough to be understood and accepted by the general public. 
Although conceptually not intrinsic to democracy, it is a normative prin-
ciple that is part of the common set of democratic aspirations. As 
Tocqueville observed so incisively, in democratic cultures, the rule of the 
majority is predominant not only via elections and formal legislation but 
also via public opinion (2000: 243–245). He claimed: “It is of the very 
essence of democratic governments that the empire of the majority is 
absolute; for in democracies, outside the majority there is nothing that 
resists it” (2000: 235).
3.3  Compromise and Democracy
Just like majority rule, compromise is also recognized as belonging to 
democracy: “If politics is the art of the possible, compromise is the art-
istry of democracy” (Gutmann & Thompson 2012: 205). This is not only 
a matter of culture and ‘mindsets’, as Gutmann and Thompson have 
argued, but also of democratic institutions: “the institutional framework 
of constitutional democracies can be viewed as the institutionalization of 
compromise-making processes” (Canivez 2011: 104). Though compro-
mise seems inherent to all kinds of politics, it is particularly ascribed to 
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democratic politics—the assumption being, not implausibly, that com-
promises are less common in authoritarian and other non-democratic 
regimes (Dixit, Grossman & Gul 2000: 533).
So compromise is part and parcel of democratic politics, but in a less 
clear and direct way than majority rule. It is situated more in the periph-
ery than in the core of the semantic field of democracy, so to speak. 
Indeed, one could say it belongs to a different tradition of conceptualiz-
ing democracy. The tradition in which majority rule plays an important 
role, presupposes that the people is ultimately homogeneous, or at least 
sufficiently so for everyone to accept the majority decision. Letting the 
majority decide for the entire political community can, in this view, safely 
be done because there is no serious risk that the community will fall 
apart. In the other tradition, however, that of compromise, the people is 
seen as deeply heterogeneous. Compromise is required to the extent that 
democracy encompasses and fosters heterogeneity among people with 
different world views, life styles, and moralities. This is not the same as 
basing compromise on so-called value pluralism, which is the doctrine, 
usually associated with Isaiah Berlin, according to which all moral and 
other values are inherently incompatible and even incommensurable 
with each other (cf. Martijn Boot’s chapter in this volume). That doc-
trine, whether true or not, does not in itself entail a commitment to a 
politics of compromise (Overeem 2018; pace Bellamy 1999: 93–114; 
Benjamin 1990: 75–106). The democratic pluralism meant here is much 
less metaphysical: it is political rather than axiological (as, admittedly, it 
sometimes also is in Bellamy’s and Benjamin’s descriptions). It is the 
notion, grounded in empirical reality and sustained by democratic ideol-
ogy, that late modern societies are irreducibly and irreversibly pluralis-
tic—multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, and multi-religious—and therefore 
rife with moral disagreement. In the words of John Rawls: “This diversity 
of doctrines—the fact of pluralism—is not a mere historical condition 
that will soon pass away; it is, I believe, a permanent feature of the public 
culture of modern democracies” (1987: 4). Because this ‘fact of pluralism’ 
is real and cannot be overthrown without unacceptable amounts of coer-
cion, compromise is essential to democratic politics.
So impressions can easily mislead us: whereas majority rule seems 
deeply inherent to democracy but on closer inspection can be more or 
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less detached from it, compromise seems rather contingent but turns out 
to be more central than expected. However this may be, both are ele-
ments of democracy as we know it and as most of us believe it should be. 
This raises the important question how the two relate to each other. This 
implies that favoring compromise over majority rule (as I do) is no less 
democratic than the opposite—it is tapping into another tradition.
3.4  Majority Rule Versus Compromise
Majority rule and compromise may both be part of democracy, but it is 
easy to see that they are nonetheless opposed in many ways, too. While 
compromises are inclusive, giving all involved parties at least a share in 
the outcome of the decision-making process, majority decisions tend to 
be more exclusive: ‘the winner takes all’. And while compromise-making 
is typically complicated, slow, and ambiguous, majoritarian decision- 
making is simple, quick, and unequivocal (Novak 2014: 684). There is 
also a difference in scale of application: majority rule is a decision-making 
procedure particularly suited for crowds, while compromise (and, a for-
tiori, consensus or unanimity) better fits much smaller groups (Mansbridge 
1980: xii). And last but not least, compromises tend to be made by politi-
cal elites, whereas majority rule is typically, and for many theorists prefer-
ably, performed at the mass level, for instance through elections or 
referendums.
Because of these and similar differences, democracy scholars (especially 
Lijphart 1984 and 1999) have argued there are actually two types of 
democracy: majoritarian democracies and consensus democracies. In the 
former, majority rule is the central principle, while in the latter compro-
mise—not consensus, the name notwithstanding—is the preferred form 
of decision-making. In the words of Vatter:
Modern liberal democracies are based on two competing visions of the 
democratic ideal. On the one hand, the majoritarian principle emphasizes 
democracy as government by the majority of the people, based on a con-
centration of power. The consensus principle, on the other hand, promotes 
the idea that democracy should represent as many people as possible and 
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provide for multiple checks and balances—thereby limiting the power of 
the central government while providing for the representation of a broader 
array of interests. (2009: 125)
This simple categorization is further elaborated with all kinds of institu-
tional and behavioral differences, not all of which are necessarily impli-
cated by the underlying distinction, but which are nonetheless helpful to 
understand the variety of contemporary democratic governments. And 
while no pure cases of majoritarian and consensus democracy may exist 
since all countries tend to be mixtures of both, it is also true that at the 
most basic level, whenever a concrete political decision has to made, it 
has to be done either by majority rule or by compromise (or perhaps 
some other procedure, such as unanimity rule). The two cannot be used 
simultaneously.
This fundamental incongruence between majority rule and compro-
mise creates serious tensions in democratic theory and practice. The need 
to give majorities their say while also protecting minorities, to come to 
quick and clear decisions while keeping wide support, to take the people 
as a unified whole and still recognize its plurality—it seems an attractive 
but impossible endeavor. Democratic governments will understandably 
try (and claim) to combine the two, but cannot but fail in doing so. And 
precisely this has serious negative consequences for democracy itself. The 
present discontent with (representative) democracy and the rise of popu-
list movements in some of the world’s most established democracies (the 
USA, the UK, and several continental European countries) can be under-
stood in light of the unfulfilled promise that these opposing democratic 
aspirations can be combined. In response, populist voters and their lead-
ers radically choose for one side—majoritarianism, presupposing the 
homogeneity of the nation—at the cost of the other, thereby endangering 
the very democratic ideal they seek to preserve. But before we see how 
that works, it first has to be acknowledged that majority rule and com-
promise also have surprisingly strong interrelations.
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3.5  Ties Between Majority Rule 
and Compromise
Given the clear contrasts between majority rule and compromise, it may 
seem counterintuitive to argue that there are also close ties between them. 
For a full understanding of their dynamic, however, their interrelations 
need to be highlighted as well. Most elementarily, the two notions have 
some structural similarities. They both play with the contrast between 
plurality and unity. Majority rule presupposes not only a difference 
between majority and minority, but also their unity, both being parts of 
a larger whole: majority rule could not function if both groups did not 
regard themselves as part of a wider community, for instance a nation- 
state. It requires a commitment to that community and the (implicit) 
promise not to secede from or rebel against it. This goes for compromise 
as well: parties in a compromise are typically opponents, but they are also 
linked to each other, even when they rather would not. Further, majority 
rule and compromise are both forward-looking. Although chosen because 
no better solution has appeared feasible in the past, their main thrust is 
prospective. Majority rule only works when the minority accepts the 
decision because it expects to become the majority sometime in the 
future. Precisely for this reason, decisions are often taken by oversized 
majorities (Schwartzberg 2018: 182). This is even more explicit for com-
promises. They involve, as etymology suggests, always a promise: 
“Compromises emerge because people recognize that they are engaged in 
a long-term endeavor. … If we had no expectation of future interactions, 
and no shared goal apart from the gains to be had from a single trade, 
then we would have minimal incentives to compromise rather than sim-
ply to bargain as one would in a one-shot game” (Schwartzberg 2018: 
171). Hence, compromises, like most majority decisions, are always pro-
visional, vain attempts to freeze time and to decide ‘for the time being’, 
with each involved party hoping to reach a better outcome later.
Secondly, and less obviously, one can say that majority rule itself is a 
kind of compromise, albeit on the decision procedure rather than the 
substance of the issues at hand. A group chooses majority rule when it 
can neither achieve full consensus nor allow hegemons, but still wants to 
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reach a decision. Under such circumstances, group members often find 
majority rule (in some form) an acceptable compromise. They forsake, at 
least temporarily and partially, their own claims to truth and justice and 
jointly agree to a third option, which translates their qualitative differ-
ences into a quantitative one: if we cannot agree, let the numbers decide, 
and we promise to stand by the outcome. Such ‘quantitative reduction-
ism’ can obviously obfuscate the moral character of the values at stake (cf. 
Martijn Boot’s chapter in this volume), but it is a compromise if any-
thing. Since no substantive agreement is found, but only a procedural 
one, such a compromise can be expected to break apart very quickly, but 
as we know from examples such as parliamentary elections and referen-
dums but also the US Supreme Court (Waldron 2016: 246–273), insti-
tutionalization can make majoritarian forms of decision-making highly 
durable. Precisely because this kind of compromise deflects attention 
from substance to procedure, actors may be more willing to uphold it. 
Even those in the minority keep hopes that the procedure will serve them 
on a next occasion.
Majority rule as a decision rule can, however, also be linked up with 
more substantive compromises—with the effect working in both direc-
tions. On the one hand, compromise often enables majority rule: com-
promises are necessary to create majorities in the first place (Baume 2017: 
79–80). In Bellamy’s words, “compromise and majority rule often go 
together, with the former making possible and legitimising the latter” 
(2018: 316). Actual rule by majorities would often be impossible without 
ex ante compromises, for instance within and between political parties. 
Hence, Weinstock has argued that ‘big tent’ political parties—the kinds 
of large political parties that tend to be generated by simple plurality 
electoral systems, as in the USA and the UK—may be particularly appro-
priate sites for deliberation aimed at compromise that enable majorities 
in Congress and Parliament to govern (2018: 188). This suggests that 
compromise can be pivotal not only in consensus democracies but in 
majoritarian democracies as well. Indeed, according to Schwartzberg 
even more so: “Paradoxically, majority rule may be more likely to gener-
ate compromise, at least in the long run, than consensus-seeking institu-
tions” (2018: 172). Precisely because of the temporary character of many 
majority decisions (particularly of simple majority decisions; usually not 
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those of supermajorities) actors will be compromise-ready, she argues: 
“Under simple majority rule, policy changes are not once-in-a- generation, 
and so the prospect of future revisions may both induce compromise ex 
ante and reduce the sense of loss ex post” (Schwartzberg 2018: 182). This 
will, however, very much depend on the topic and the constitutional and 
political circumstances at hand.
On the other hand, majority decisions often generate ex post compro-
mises. Every majority decision creates its own losers and one of the big 
questions of democratic politics is why they would accept the outcome of 
an election or another decision-making procedure: the puzzle of so-called 
loser’s consent (Anderson et  al. 2005). There may be many factors to 
explain this phenomenon—institutional, cultural, and tactical—but one 
of them definitely is also that after majority decisions, compromises tend 
to be made with regard to their interpretation and implementation. So 
we should not think of majority decisions (nor of compromises, for that 
matter) as discrete events; they are part of a stream of decisions and con-
tinuous modifications. The blow of their impact tends to be softened by 
compromises that are not so much political as well as legal, administra-
tive, and social. These compromises are typically made behind the scenes, 
outside the limelight of the mass media. After the people or its represen-
tatives have decided on, for instance, exiting the European Union, build-
ing an airport, legalizing the use of cannabis, or any other topic, it is up 
to civil servants and other experts to hammer out the precise details of the 
policies required. This often requires painstaking negotiations to arrive at 
workable compromises that still align recognizably with the majority 
decision.
So we see that majority rule and compromise are opposed but also 
often go together. Precisely this combination leads to problems because 
the ex ante and ex post compromises surrounding majority decisions are 
often not politically recognized. The general public only sees the majority 
decision (an election outcome, a parliamentary vote, and a referendum 
result), without understanding how the winning majority came into 
being and without knowing what happens with the majority decision 
later. It believes that ‘the majority has spoken’ and that its will should be 
executed right away, only to discover that the resulting policy is complex, 
slow, and ambiguous. This can lead to incomprehension and alienation 
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(what the Germans call Politikverdrossenheit) and ultimately affect the 
quality of and support for constitutional democracy itself. This poten-
tially explosive dynamic, I will now argue, particularly holds true for the 
majoritarian institution par excellence: referendums.
3.6  Referendums
Referendums tend to be defended mainly with arguments about public 
participation and deliberation: “a referendum can play a crucial role in 
catalyzing public debate, in focusing the attention of everyone on the 
issues at hand, in engaging ordinary citizens to inform themselves on the 
core issues being debated” (Leydet 2004: 255). They also have important 
drawbacks, however. Leydet, although a qualified advocate of referen-
dums herself, mentions three of them: referendums lead to division and 
fragmentation within the political community; they are “structurally 
polarizing: to a very complex set of propositions that address diverse and 
difficult issues, citizens are faced with only two options: Yes or No”; and 
“a referendum campaign is relatively short; too short to act as a ‘learning 
process’ through which the different sections of a divided society might 
come to better understand and appreciate the claims made by others and 
the delicate compromises needed in order to acknowledge and, to some 
extent, satisfy these claims” (2004: 253). In short, referendums engage 
citizens, but they also divide people, simplify issues, and precipitate deci-
sions. Here I will concentrate on Leydet’s last point: the ways in which 
referendums affect the politics of compromise.
Referendums are often presented as an alternative to compromises. 
The latter tend to be hammered out by professional elites, detached from 
the wider public, which leads to outcomes that often reflect the politi-
cally opportune more than what is substantially optimal or democrati-
cally desirable. A referendum, by contrast, if it is well designed (Cheneval 
& el-Wakil 2018), not only involves citizens but also brings decisions and 
policies more in line with their interests and preferences. It would be 
wrong, however, to think that referendums mean the end of compromise. 
In fact, like all forms of majority rule, they induce politicians to make all 
kinds of compromises both beforehand and afterwards.
 P. Overeem
59
Ex ante, the mere possibility of a referendum influences the process of 
compromise-making. As Leydet has argued: “If the negotiators know in 
advance and work with the assumption that any negotiated agreement 
will be submitted to a national referendum, then this awareness will dis-
cipline their bargaining and direct them to an agreement more likely to 
stand the test of public debate” (2004: 245). A bit later, she explains:
negotiators laboring under the shadow of a referendum would strive to 
ensure that, both in form and in content, the result of their discussions 
could be justified to a majority or the relevant majorities of citizens. They 
would thus have to search for the best available equilibrium between what 
they can agree on and what the public(s) can be persuaded to accept. 
Negotiators would be encouraged not to lose sight of the various audiences 
for their agreement: at the very minimum, the particular constituency they 
represent and the public as a whole. (2004: 249)
Usually, this anticipatory effect will be applauded as democratic and 
promoting responsiveness to the desires of the electorate. It can, of 
course, also distort the quality of the compromise: negotiators can aim 
at an agreement that is sufficiently popular to pass rather than at a 
substantially (legally, economically, technologically, or otherwise) 
better one.
Two caveats are due, however. Firstly, in many political systems com-
promise is chosen not to enable a majority decision, but rather to prevent 
it. Existing institutions of majority rule can spur anticipatory compro-
mises, so that majority decisions, including referendums, do not even 
have to take place (Schwartzberg 2018). This effect has been shown, for 
instance, for the Council of the European Union, where consensus is 
sought and compromises are struck in order to prevent voting (Novak 
2013). It also applies to cases with referendums. Article 42 of the Danish 
constitution, for example, which is meant to protect minorities by giving 
them a relatively easily accessible opportunity to initiate a referendum 
against unwelcome passed bills, has led to a strong political culture of 
compromise-making—so much so, that the provided-for type of referen-
dum has taken place only once, in 1963 (Forestiere 2008: 456–457, 
461–463). This does not mean that article 42 is ineffective, of course, but 
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that the Danes prefer to reach their goal—protecting the interests of 
minorities—by circumventing majoritarianism and opting for more con-
sensual forms of politics instead. Even in referendum-prone Switzerland, 
it has worked in this way:
In the quest to minimize the risks harbored by direct democracy, the infor-
mal search for a broadly supported compromise has required the formation 
of broadly supported multi-party governments, which make the important 
decisions. Extensive power sharing in the Swiss government is intended to 
produce solutions acceptable to a sufficiently large majority in parliament, 
for the risk of optional referendums and popular initiatives to be reduced. 
(Vatter 2009: 146)
In short, the mere ‘threat’ of a referendum can induce power sharing and 
compromise.
Secondly, the unifying effect of referendums should not be exagger-
ated. It seems true that referendums force politicians to seek support out-
side of their own party and constituency and that they thus can “work as 
a strong incentive towards coalition-building and against fragmentation” 
(Leydet 2004: 255). But we should not forget that this decrease of frag-
mentation comes at the cost of polarization: coalitions are indeed built, 
but only to create two large camps (Yes vs. No). As the campaign pro-
ceeds, the chances that these two will come closer become smaller rather 
than bigger. Again, compromises are made ex ante to achieve a decisive 
majority, not to provide substantive agreement on the issues at hand.
Referendums also typically lead to ex post compromise-making. In a 
referendum, voters are presented with a simple ballot (yes/no), which cre-
ates the illusion of an unequivocal outcome: the majority has pointed out 
the direction to go. But as we know since the Brexit referendum if not 
long before, things are rarely so clear-cut. Once the dust has settled, inev-
itably questions arise like: was there a more or less cohesive majority, can 
we know who were its members (and who not), and can we say what 
exactly it wanted? Usually, the answer is a threefold ‘no’. As Bellamy suc-
cinctly put it: “Within pluralist societies, appeals to a popular majority 
are largely mythical” (2018: 318; referring to Weale 2018). And the myth 
is not even innocent: “An appeal to a collective popular will that 
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transcends [the] plurality of individual and group wills, as in a referen-
dum, becomes almost by definition dominating” (Bellamy 2018: 318). 
Referendums, at least outside Switzerland and California, are such 
marked events in the political life of a nation, that ignoring or diluting 
the vote is politically impossible. And still, the outcome has to be modi-
fied if not diluted in order to be turned into legally, economically, politi-
cally, and socially acceptable legislation. Again, Brexit is a case in point: it 
shows very well that compromise-making between the involved actors (in 
casu the EU and UK, but also various actors within the UK and even 
within the Conservative Party) is inevitable, not only beforehand, but 
also after a referendum has been held. And this is not the exception but 
the rule. In all modern democracies, even those that have much experi-
ence with referendums like the polities just mentioned, referendum days 
are majoritarian intervals in the ongoing politics of compromise rather 
than vice versa. The combination of and contrast between them creates 
the dangerous dynamic highlighted before: as the majoritarian momen-
tum of a referendum heightens expectations, the inevitable politics of 
compromise beforehand and afterwards can only create disappointment 
and resentment. This dynamic occurs with regular elections and parlia-
mentary votes already, but even more so with the marked event of refer-
endums. Rather than instruments of engagement, they thus easily become 
sources of alienation.
3.7  Mitigating Majoritarianism
While it may be true that majority rule is a minimum requirement of 
democracy, arguably the quality of a democracy depends more on how it 
treats its minorities than on whether majorities can have their sway. 
Indeed, there is every reason to be distrustful of majorities and thus to be 
skeptical of majority rule as a guiding principle of good government. As 
Tocqueville eloquently put it:
What therefore is a majority taken collectively, if not an individual who has 
opinions and most often interests contrary to another individual that one 
names the minority? Now, if you accept that one man vested with 
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 omnipotence can abuse it against his adversaries, why not accept the same 
thing for a majority? Have men changed in character by being united? 
Have become more patient before obstacles by becoming stronger? As for 
me, I cannot believe it; and I shall never grant to several the power of doing 
everything that I refuse to a single one of those like me. (2000: 240)
In regard to the protection of minorities, compromise generally does bet-
ter than majority rule (Bellamy 2018: 315). Surely, compromises can be 
very harmful for minorities as well, but overall a politics of compromise 
tends to be less dominating and to better track the interests of a wide 
range of stakeholders than majoritarian politics. Even two centuries after 
Tocqueville, the danger of the tyranny of the majority is never far away: 
“majoritarian decision-making risks creating persistent minorities of one 
or more segmented groups of citizens” (Bellamy 2018: 315). In order to 
reduce this danger of majoritarian tyranny, especially in segmented soci-
eties, Bellamy proposes two approaches:
Here we may have reason to at least grant minorities a proportional voice 
in the community, so they are not consistently outvoted on collective mat-
ters (…), possibly by allowing a degree of self-government to different 
minority communities, or—more demandingly—to find ways whereby 
their concerns can be integrated into common policies, especially in areas 
where there is disagreement as to what is ‘completely undesirable’. 
(2018: 317)
Of these two approaches—self-government (arrangements in which 
minorities are granted some degree of autonomy) and integrative com-
promises (arrangements in which minorities and the majority share their 
interests to find a common solution)—it is clear that Bellamy prefers the 
latter: he hopes for a “willingness to find integrative compromises that 
recognize each citizen’s entitlement to be considered an equal member of 
the deliberative community” (2018: 318). Now, it is hard to disagree 
with the attractiveness of that solution, but one could be rather skeptical 
about its feasibility and durability. Integrative compromises, particularly 
for difficult political and moral issues (such as abortion, immigration, 
and markers of national identity), will be hard to find and probably not 
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last very long. For this reason, besides the fact that it also more congruent 
with Tocqueville’s view, Bellamy’s other approach deserves more credit 
than he gives it. Emboldening minorities can be done in various ways. 
One is to increase the number of issues for which supermajorities are 
required. This is a widely used and time-tested—although certainly not 
perfect—way to protect minority rights (Schwartzberg 2014). Securing 
that laws have wide acceptance and not just narrow majority support has 
both practical and principled value (Wendt 2018). Self-government and 
subsidiarity—via administrative decentralization, devolution, and the 
like—would be even better. It recognizes, realistically, that in pluralistic 
societies the idea that the people has a singular will which can be repre-
sented through majority decisions is a phantasy (Bellamy 2018: 318).
Besides empowering minorities, there are also many ways to directly 
mitigate majoritarianism and reduce the ‘adversary’ character of contem-
porary politics (Mansbridge 1980). One can think of increasing the 
number of institutions and practices typical of consensus democracy and 
of being very restrictive with referendums. Now I agree with Bellamy that 
one should assess political institutions such as referendums not categori-
cally and not just by themselves, but as part of the ‘institutional mix’ 
characterizing a particular political system (2018: 312). My limited claim 
here is that we should not favor referendums out of discontent with the 
politics of compromises. Sure, there is “an unavoidable disjunction 
between the kind of compromise agreement that can come out of com-
plex intergovernmental negotiations and the type of outcome that a 
majority of citizens might be made to support” (Leydet 2004: 235). But 
referendums are no solution for this undeniable problem. They rather 
make things worse, raising expectations to a level at which they can never 
be satisfied and only leading to disappointment: on the part of the losing 
minority, obviously, but also on the part of the majority when its vote is 
diluted in the policy-making process. Again, Brexit is the case that comes 
most readily to mind, but experiences with referendums in France, 
Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands, and various other countries show, I 
believe, the same trend of raised expectations and deepened disappoint-
ment. In order to break this negative spiral and thus, in the end, to pre-
serve constitutional democracy, majoritarianism should, be considerably 
mitigated.
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3.8  Conclusion
This chapter has shown how in modern democratic politics majority rule 
and compromise are related. I have drawn on Alexis de Tocqueville 
because I believe the thought of that great theorist of democracy can help 
us sense where modernity’s favorite regime is most jeopardized. We have 
seen that compromise and majority rule are opposed, but also closely 
related in various ways. And precisely the dynamic of back-and-forth 
between them poses dangers for the quality of constitutional democracy 
in general and for freedom in particular—dangers which, as Tocqueville 
already saw, are best averted by mitigating majority rule and strengthen-
ing minorities.
In Democracy in America, Tocqueville admittedly deals hardly with 
compromise. For him, democracy is the unmitigated realization of the 
will of the majority (which is why he regarded the tyranny of the majority 
its greatest threat). He did not perceive democracy (at least as he had seen 
it in America) as full of compromises, nor did he consider compromise 
itself as a way to ‘temper’ majority rule. Perhaps he underestimated the 
heterogeneity of democratic society; perhaps he regarded a politics of 
compromise as too ‘elitist’ to be sustainable in democratic times. However 
that may be, near the end of the second volume, in the famous chapter 
on ‘What sort of despotism democratic nations have to fear’, he mean-
ingfully speaks of modern democracy as a “sort of compromise between 
administrative despotism and popular sovereignty” (2000: 662; emphasis 
added). This seems an important example of his (critical) use of the term, 
but one can wonder whether this is a compromise at all. It is evidently 
not the kind of compromise resulting from negotiations between dis-
agreeing parties. It is not even a compromise in which the elements go at 
the cost of each other; it rather seems an amalgam in which both ele-
ments are realized to the highest possible degree. The very combination 
of majority rule (to which for Tocqueville, as we have seen, popular sov-
ereignty was tantamount) and compromise (epitomized by the adminis-
trative despotism he criticizes) creates a dynamic that causes severe risks 
to the quality of constitutional democracy in terms of democratic legiti-
macy, government effectiveness, and citizen trust. We see this happening, 
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I believe, in our time. The compromises struck to create majorities, to 
prevent majority decisions, and to mitigate their impact can all be easily 
seen as elitist gaming, if not as democratic betrayal. In an ever-growing 
democratic frenzy of majoritarianism, they are regarded as signs of admin-
istrative or even political despotism which can be legitimately over-
thrown—if, at least, democratic citizens have the revolutionary spirit to 
do that.
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